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GRASSROOTs

NGO

REGULATION AND CHINA'S LOCAL LEGAL
CULTURE
Anna Jane High*

Law-lauding ideology and rhetorichas been increasingly evident in China
since the end of the CulturalRevolution. In conjunction nAth decades of
rapid andprolfc legal institution-building, this hasprovded rich data
for scholarship on the trajectory of Chinas legal system, and the nature
of rule and order in modern Chinese society. Yet a solely law-centric
approach to state regulation is not aposite topainting a completepicture
o how order is maintainedin the distinctly non-legal Chinese clture.
Drangonfleldwork investigating non-state Chinese ophanage I argue
that the surdval andproliferationof such quasi- or non-legalgrassroots
non-government organizations is indicative of, andpremised on, both the
un deldy andfragmented nature of the Chinese state, and several defining
points of distinction of law as a cultural notion in the Chinese context.
These include a markedpreoccupationwith legitimag over legalit, and
paternalistic discipline and discretion over impartial adjudication. An
increased appreciationfor China ' local legal culture has far-reaching
implicationsfor the ways in which both legal academics andpractitioners
engage with the Chinese legal system, which is best approached nAthout
constrainingpreconceptions about how law is used and regarded in local
contexts.
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INTRODUCTION

What is the role of law in modern China? This question is of increasing
importance to observers and practitioners, as China's economic, cultural and
political influence has grown exponentially in recent decades. Foreign direct
investment in China is on the rise,' its leadership is playing an increasingly
prominent role in regional and global diplomacy and politics,' and the United
States has announced a rebalancing of its strategic focus towards Asia and
China in particular. More recently, with the 2012 People's Republic of China
(PRC) leadership transition, and high-profile legal/political cases such as the
Gu Kailai affair,4 China's emerging and evolving legal system continues to be
widely scrutinized. Back in 1996, China's President Jiang Zemin adopted a new
official policy of ruling the country in accordance with law, and establishing a

1

Kevin Zhang, What Explains the Boom of Foreign Direct Investment in China?,54(2)

2

David Shambaugh, Reforming Chinak Djplomagy, COPENHAGEN
RESEARCH CENTRE (2010).

3

Christian Le Miere, America Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension, 54(3) SURVIVAL:
GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY 81 (june-July, 2012).
Andrew Jacobs, China Defers Death Penaltyfor Disgraced Offidalk Wife, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes/com/2012/08/21/world/asia/chinadefers-death-penalty-for-gu-kailai.html.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 54 (2001).

4
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socialist law-ruled state

(yifathguo,jiansheshuhuihyZfahguo), a policy that is now

incorporated into the PRC Constitution.' Such law-lauding ideology and rhetoric
has been increasingly evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution
in 1976 and, in conjunction with decades of rapid and prolific legal institutionbuilding, has provided rich data for ample scholarship and discourse on the
trajectory of China's legal system, and the nature of rule and order in modern
Chinese society. This body of literature offers insight into China's legal evolution
and development, and is a useful framework for exploring the nexus between law
and order in Chinese society.
However rather than focusing on central Party-state rhetoric and policies,
this article approaches the question of law's role in China from an underutilized
perspective, namely that of local state-society relationships. Further, it explores
and challenges the legal/illegal binary presupposed by many Chinese legal studies,
and its aptness in the Chinese context. Based on empirical research of a set of
'illegal' NGOs, namely privately-run, unregulated grassroots orphanages, I argue
that ground-level observations of local understandings, expectations and practices
relating to law and order reveal a context best characterized as non-legal, being
legitimacy-centric rather than law-centric. Formal law is not regarded by local
Chinese actors in a way that is necessarily familiar to Western observers. Local
NGOs acting beyond the limits of legally acceptable behaviour regard themselves,
and are commonly regarded by local state and social actors, as legitimate; the
legality of their existence and actions are not regarded as central to that legitimacy.
The existence of such non-legal NGOs is not regarded as problematic, and is
premised not on an organization's ability to abide by formal laws, but rather on
an ability to regard informal rules and norms regulating their relationship with the
state. The prevailing 'legal sensibility' in China, as visible at the local state-society
interface, resonates more with themes of paternalism and discipline, rather than
law-centric ideas of legality and rule of law.

5

Randall Peerenboom, Competing Conceptions of Rue of Law in China, in ASIAN

DISCOURSES

OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN

US, 109 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2003).
ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoXingfa [People's Republic of China Constitution], (Mar. 14,
2004), art. 5.
COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE

6

3

Vol. 9(2)

Sodo-Lgal Review

2013

I begin in Part I by introducing the rule-of-law perspective on law and order
in modern Chinese culture. I discuss how the (arguably Western) tendency to
approach spaces of order from such a law-centric perspective is not conducive to
painting a full picture of the Chinese context. From there, I turn to the empirical
data, focusing on the experiences of informal, 'illegal' or 'quasi-legal' grassroots
NGOs as local governments utilize non-legal, legitimacy-centric, paternalistic
norms, institutions and processes to structure local order and oversight. Part II
introduces China's civil society landscape and the case study NGOs, and Part
III presents findings related to their interaction with local government, largely
beyond the NGO framework established by law. These findings, discussed in
Part IV, demonstrate that studies of China's legal history, culture, evolution and
future development benefit from attention to the underlying culturally-contingent/
specific expectations and assumptions about the proper role and function of law
in maintaining social order. Despite thirty years of law institution building and
legal reform, central law-lauding rhetoric has only begun to penetrate China locally,
and the lack of a culture of legality, as presented below, must be considered and
accounted for when dealing with questions of Chinese regulation, law and policy.

II.

RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL CULTURE

China's post-Cultural Revolution legal system, which had to be established
from scratch following the complete dismantling of all legal processes and
institutions during the 'ten year turmoil',' has been pieced together in a remarkably
short time. Over the past thirty years, the Chinese Party-state has been gradually but
surely moving towards more law-lauding ideology, at least rhetorically, including
an official policy, introduced into the PRC Constitution in the 1990s, of ruling the
country in accordance with law.8 In this fascinating, rapidly changing, and often
contradictory context, scholarship on the trajectory of China's legal system, and
the role of law in this new China, abounds.9 The main empirical issues addressed
7

8
9

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, instituted by Chairman Mao in 1966,
is commonly referred to as the 'ten year turmoil', due to the widespread economic,
political and social chaos experienced during the decade of revolution.
Supra note 6, at art. 5.
See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAw (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2002); Karen G. Turner et al. (eds.), THE LIMITs OF THE RULE OF LAw IN
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in this field include the retreat of the Party-state, the evolution of the legislature,
judiciary, legal profession and administrative law regimes, and the nexus between
rule of law and economic development, democracy and human rights. The 'law
and order' meta-narrative is visibly played out in Party discourse, Five-year Plans,"
Constitutional evolution and the astounding pace of development of the formal
legal system.
The basic distinction made in studies of the role of law in maintaining order
is between rule by, and rule of, law:
Whereas the core of rule of law is the abity of law andlegal system to impose meaningful
restraintson the state and individualmembers of the rukng ekte, rule ly law refers to an
instrumentalconception of law in which law is merely a tool to be used as the state sees ft."

In China, the distinction has proved difficult to make empirically (which
is nicely reflected in the lack of a linguistic distinction, both concepts generally
translated as faZhi, literally 'law-ruled'). While generally scholars are in agreement
that the direction of legal reform over the last three decades has been away from
rule by man and towards rule by law, the extent to which rule of law is in fact
emerging, and its optimal nature and role in the Chinese context, are matters of
much debate in the literature.1
(U. of Washington Press, 2000); Enic Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND.
L. 43 (2001); Albert Chen, Toward a Legal Enkghtenment: Discussions in
Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125 (1999-2000); Yufan
Hao, From Rule of Man to Rule of Law: An Unintended Consequence of Corruptionin China
in the 1990s, 8(22) J. OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 405 (1999); Cao Jianming, W'TO and the
Rule of Law in China, 16 TEMP. INT'L& COMP. L. J. 379 (2002); Larry Diamond, The Rule
of Law as Transition to Democracy, 12(35) J. oF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 319 (2003); Pat K.
Chew, The Rule of Law: China Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 43 (2005); Geor I-intzen, The Place of Law in the PRC Culture, 11 CULTURAL
DYNAMICS 167 (1999); Zhiping Liang, Tradition and Change: Law and Order in a Pluraist
Landscape, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMics 215 (1999); Karen Turner, The CriminalBody and the
Body Poltic: Punishments in Early China, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMics 237 (1999).
CHINA

J. TRANSNATL.

10

11
12

The 'Five Year Plans' of China are a series of political decisions, setting social and
economic development initiatives and priorities for the PRC. The first was promulgated
in 1953; a new Five Year Plan is due for the 2016-2020 period. See, e.g., Cindy Fan,
China Eleventh Five-Year Plan, 47(6) EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONomics 708 (2006).
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at 8.
See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Law WithoutLaw,orls "Chinese Law"an Oxymoron?,11(2) WILLIAM
& MARY BILL OF RIGHTS

J.

655 (2003).
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The voluminous literature on rule by/of law in China is useful for delving
into the empirical question of the nexus between law and order in Chinese society.
The focus of many studies of Chinese law and order is fixed on the most visible
manifestation of the working out of that nexus, namely institution-building,
rhetoric and policy at the central/top level of the Party-state. Chinese and foreign
scholars alike have put forward a vast array of opinions and descriptions, from
conservative to liberal, on how the macro legal culture of China continues to
be shaped by these winds of change blowing from Beijing and (purportedly)
throughout China. The rule of law question has been asked through the lenses
of globalisation, modernisation and economic development. I begin not with
these meta-narratives, but instead ask what expectations, meanings and traditions
relating to law and order (which I will broadly term Chinese legal sensibility) are
evident at the level of local relationships between officials and citizens? Traditional
and historical cultural factors in which Chinese conceptions of law and order are
grounded have been discussed in depth in the literature," but tend, like the rule
of law debate generally, to be examined at the level of the elite rulers and powerholders. In this article, the focus shifts from official, state-endorsed conceptions
of law and order, to the experiences and expectations of citizens in society. With
regard to the former, opinions diverge in the literature on whether and to what
extent the Chinese polity possess a notion of law that is consistent with that
required by rule of law. William Alford, for example, argues that "the principal state
architects of China's post-Cultural Revolution law reform project have a genuine
ambivalence toward their undertaking". 4 Michael Dowdle, on the other hand,
argues that any such ambivalence "manifests itself in practice, not conception.
Normatively, the Chinese, including the leadership, are overwhelmingly consistent
in proclaiming the supremacy of law over other forms of political authority and
over private interests".' The debate would benefit from greater attention to
13

The most notable works include PEERENBOOM, supra note 9 and the 1999 special edition
of CULTURAL DYNAMICS, with contributions from (inter alia) William Alford, Geor
Hintzen, Karen Turner, Michael Dowdle, Carine Defoort and Randall Peerenboom,
and Zhiping Liang. See, also, THOMAS STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE
SHANGHAJ MIXED COURT 1911-27 (Univ. of Washington Press, 1992).

14

William Alford, A Second Great Wall? Chinak Post-CulturalRevolution Project of Legal

15

Construction, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193, 198 (1999).
Michael Dowdle, HereticalLaments: China and the Fallades of 'Rule of Law', 11
DYNAMICS 287, 301 (1999).

6
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popular legal sensibility, as manifested in civil society and its engagement with
low-level officials. At this local interface between state and society, ordinary
citizens and government officials bring their own traditions and histories to their
engagement with the legal system and the officials who represent it.
By moving in this way from the macro to the micro, texture is added to our
understanding of the ideologies and traditions in which 'law and order' concepts
in China continue to be grounded today, and a contribution will also, reflexively,
be made to the bigger picture themes of rule of law and legal consciousness. 6
Empirical grassroots studies have potential to shed much light on the extent to
which Beijing's winds of change, including the state's "verbal homage to the
sanctity of law"," are penetrating the local sphere. In fact, the local picture painted
herein is one in which law is not supreme, either in practice or rhetorically, and
many features of even a thin conception of rule of law are missing. However, as it
will be shown, even though the 'real' rules of engagement between the case study
NGOs and the state have more to do with legitimacy, connections and 'saving
face' than with many of the features of even a thin conception of rule of law, the
picture that emerges is not one of "lawless chaos".'" The local snapshot presented
herein is one imbued with themes of paternalism, game-playing, give-and-take,
suspicion and subordination. Above all, it is one of order - not, admittedly, a
type of order associated with rule of law and its threshold requirements such as
predictability and certainty, but order nonetheless. My aim is not an ideological
defence of, or policy recommendation regarding, this local picture, but a reexamination of the law-order nexus locally and what it tells us about notions and
ideas about law and order in Chinese culture and society.
This approach to 'law and order' is closely tied to 'law as culture', which seeks
a more meaningful construction of law situated in its total social context. In order
16

17
18

The term 'legal consciousness' is common in socio-legal studies - for the purpose of this
paper, I adopt a simple definition, namely 'ways in which ordinarypeople.. understand and
make sense of law' (Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, Conformiy, Contestation,and Resistance:
An Account of Legal Consciousness,26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 731 (1991-1992), at 731.
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at 217.
Compare aith Hintzen, supra note 9, at 169 (arguing that the picture that emerges on
examining the social realities behind 'China's vociferous legal aspirations' is 'one of
lawless chaos, where status, connections and money set the 'real' rules').
7

Vol. 9(2)

Sodo-Lgal Review

2013

to investigate a culture's dominant underlying beliefs about and meanings of law,
Clifford Geertz advocates a "hermeneutic tacking between two fields", broadly,
culture and law, allowing light to be shed on the mutually constitutive relationship
between the two. 1 Law is not studied as a semi-autonomous phenomenon, but is
viewed as partaking of concepts that extend across many domains of social life,
and analysed as "an extremely characteristic part of the entire social fabric".2
In approaching this 'law as culture' nexus in the Chinese context, a common
starting point is to examine Confucian and/or Socialist traditions, and to draw a
connection with the emerging legal system of the past thirty years. 2 ' For example,
scholars often draw attention to the Confucian emphasis on harmony, and its
deeply embedded preference for li (rites or rituals) over fa (law) as the means of
attaining political order. The latter is far less exalted in status and only "grudgingly
accepted as a necessary evil" in the face of the failure of ritual order.2 Confucian
political discourse is tied to a strong paternalistic tradition "in which the ruled are
expected to defer to mother and father officials (fumuguan) much as children defer
to their parents".2 3 Paternalism, hierarchicalism, and a preference for customary or
informal systems of dispute resolution are seen as hallmarks of Chinese culture,
in addition to the very great importance placed by society on guanxi (personal
networks) and renqing (human feelings, obligations or empathy), and particular/
substantive justice over general/procedural. 4 The rise of Socialism in more recent
history did little to interrupt the continuation of these themes, and "further
called into question the normative basis of law".2 5 Law under Mao was seen as
"an instrument to strengthen a paternalistic state", and continued to be "held
in low esteem as a means of achieving social order".2 6 Geor Hintzen similarly
presents three continuing and distinctive aspects of Chinese culture, namely the
persistent normative force of the family model in social life; the notion of power
and its consolidation in the hands of individuals rather than in institutions; and
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (Basic Books, 1973).
Id.
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9.
Carine Defoort and Randall Peerenboom, Law and Order in China, I, 11(2) CULTURAL
DYNAMICS 131, 132 (1999).
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at 9.
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at Chapters 2 and 3.
Defoort and Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 132.
PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at 47-48.
8
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an 'essentialist' view of reality that leads to 'concretisation' of general policies
(that is, the working out of policy implementation details after the promulgation
in formal law and policy of higher-level general principles). Hintzen argues that
owing to these three aspects of Chinese culture, "[formal] law cannot fulfil the

same abstract, general and directly binding role as it does on the basis of western
scholasticism" and in fact never did play such a role in China.2 7
Such studies usefully demonstrate the by now well-canvassed point that if
rule of law is to develop in China, it will be in a particularly Chinese context and
so will have particularly Chinese characteristics. Having regard to the impact of
cultural factors on the modern Chinese legal system is an imperative aspect of
a meaningful depiction of law's role, whether the role is labelled 'rule by law' or
'rule of law'. However, a potential shortcoming of such a law/culture framework
is that it presumes that, so long as the context is accounted for, it is possible to
identify ideas, concepts and institutions comparable to those of the West, which
we might term 'legal'.2 8 With regard to the aforementioned meta-narrative of
China's developing legal system, a narrative defined and coloured in recent decades
by central state attention to the law and order nexus, this does not seem to be
a problematic assumption. However, in looking at the local ideas, concepts and
institutions of China, an approach is needed which allows for the possibility that
a different type of ideology may also be relevant.
In this vein, Thomas Stephens, in his study of the Imperial Shanghai Mixed
Court,2 9 questions whether a law-centric framework is apposite in the traditionally
disciplinarian context of China. Stephens presents two contrasting modes of
social control, the "adjudicative /legal," and the "disciplinary/parental", arguing
that traditional Chinese justice fits the latter mould more than the former. The
Western adjudicative/legal model involves "rigid, universal, specific imperatives"
applied to all equally. 0 In a disciplinarian system, order excludes law, and is rather
characterised as "the harmony of pattern anising spontaneously from within.
27
28

Hintzen, supra note 9, at 178.
STEPHENS, supra note 13, at viii.

29

This court's mandate was to apply Chinese law to Chinese residents of a foreign enclave
in Shanghai.
STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 4.

30
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The idea of predetermined, rigid, universal imperatives governing conduct
and imposing order from without is not there".3 ' This denotes more than just
paternalism, but a uniquely Chinese presentation of self, both individually and
collectively, as embedded in a "group-hierarchical society" in which "right conduct
consists in doing what is commanded", 32 and the emphasis is on "[o]bedience to
superiors in a hierarchy of authority".33 Stephens argues that a disciplinary theory
is necessary and appropriate when studying order in China because
itprovides an alternativeframework of pngnles in terms of which a much more credible
and convincingpicture of Chineseprocesses of dispute resolution and the enforcement of
order can be projected than any that is possible in terms of the prinjles,concepts, and
vocabulary of famiiar Western legal systems.34
Stephens' thesis demonstrates the important, and often overlooked, point
that there are different ways of thinking about order in China, some of which
do not coincide with the Western underpinnings of law, legality and rule of law.
Stephens' theory is an important contribution to my theoretical framework, for
while I agree with Geor Hintzen that "cultural values are of determining influence
for the way law is viewed in a society",35 it is important that the question of how
law is viewed is approached without constraining theoretical preconceptions.

III.

CASE STUDY - GRASSROOTS ORPHANAGE

NGOs

In the remainder of this article, I turn to the question of how law, order and
legal culture are experienced and evidenced locally in the interactions between
local officials and 'illegal'3 6 grassroots NGOs engaged in orphan care. Through
in-depth interviews and participant observation, I gathered data from a particular
field of grassroots NGO activity, namely the care of orphaned and abandoned
children. What follows is an introduction to the landscape of Chinese NGOs
31

Id. at 8.

32

Id. at 18.

33

Id. at 5.
Id. at xii.

34
35
36

Id. at 167.
Terms such as 'legal' and 'illegal' are definitionally problematic in the current context,

where the laws and rules relating to unregistered orphanages are ambiguous. The term
'illegal NGO' is used as a shorthand which includes quasi- or non-legal organizations,
as discussed further below
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generally and non-government orphanages more specifically, and the grassroots
orphanages which comprise the case studies for this research project.

1. China's Civil Society Landscape
The concept of a non-governmental organization is, in China, loaded with
meanings not necessarily apparent or obvious to outside observers. The literal
translation of 'non-governmental organization' isfei.hengiuZhi, which can also
be taken to mean 'anti-government organization' (fei meaning both 'non' and
'anti'), a linguistic nuance which aptly reflects the perceived tension between
the emergence of civil society organizations and the preservation of China's
communist political ideology. Through the promulgation, beginning in 1989
with the regulations on 'Social Organisations' (shehuituanti), of a number of new
laws relating to charities and NGOs, the Chinese government has evinced its
concern with maintaining tight control over the newly emerging state-society
relationship,3 and both domestic and foreign NGOs continue to face significant
practical obstacles to achieving recognized legal status despite a clear framework
providing for their registration. In fact, given the tight control maintained by
government over NGOs, whether 'civil society' can be said to have emerged in
China is debatable. Chinese NGOs operate on a spectrum of autonomy from
state bureaucracy, with government-organised NGOs functioning at one end of
the spectrum and grassroots NGOs at the other. Government-organised NGOs
(GONGOs, also known as officially organised/top-down NGOs, as compared
to popular/bottom-up NGOs) are "citizen-led efforts from organisations that
are nominally independent, but in fact are often established by and retain close
ties with the state" .3'A great deal of 'cascading' oversight of bottom-up NGOs
occurs using top-down NGOs as intermediaries. The demarcation and isolation
of 'state' from 'society' is thus particularly problematic in China, where so many
'social' organisations are in fact a creation of the state.
37

Qiusha Ma, The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?, 31
Q. 306 (2002). See alsoJillianAshley and Pengyu He,

NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR

Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Entironmentfor "Grassroots"
NGOs in China Today, 26 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL 29 (2008);
Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: The Developmentof Social Organisationsin China, 161 CHINA
38

Q. 124 (2000), in relation to Social Organisations in particular.
Ashley and He, supra note 37, at 32.
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It remains the case that most NGOs in China today, and the majority of the
interviewees for the current study, are not registered with the relevant government
department (Ministry of Civil Affairs, hereafter 'MCR'), and can be described as
unofficial, grassroots NGOs (caogeuZghz). According to the MCA, at the end of
2008 there were approximately 415,000 registered NGOs in China, 9 most of
which are widely assumed to be GONGOs. In interview, one provincial Charity
Federation Director told me that the numbers of unregistered charities in China are
'comparatively low'. 40 However, it is commonly estimated that there are between
two and eight million NGOs in China, meaning the vast majority are operating
outside of the formal legal structure. 41

2. Orphanage Grassroots NGOs: History and Operations
The grassroots NGOs interviewed for the current study all care for orphaned
and abandoned children. Since the Cultural Revolution, during which time foreign
mission workers were ejected from the country and private orphanages either
closed or appropriated by the state, presumptively only government organisations
have the right to operate orphanages or foster homes in China. Today, however,
there are a large number of non-government orphanages and homes caring for
children across China.4' These organisations constitute an alternative, parallel and
39

40
41

42

WEBSITE, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/listTitle.do?dictionid=2201
30, 2009). According to Ashley and He (supranote 37, at 41), these
Nov
(last visited
figures represent a significant number of new registrations since 2006, when there
were 186,000 Social Organizations, 159,000 Private Non-Enterprise Units (PNEUs)
and 1,138 Foundations [these are the three types of registered civil society-type entities
available under the Chinese NGO framework].
Interview with XiJieming, Director, Shandong Charity Federation, injJinan, China (Sep.
21, 2009).
CHINA

NPO

Interview with Madam Leng, founder and director of Star Village, in Beijing, China
(Aug. 9, 2010) - estimates between 2 and 7 million actual NGOs in existence; Interview
with Father Thomas, founder of Chinese orphanage support organization Wagner
Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug 11, 2010) - estimates between 6 and 8 million non-registered
or commercially-registered NGOs.
The surveyed sector includes both Chinese-run orphanages, caring for children directly

surrendered into their care, and foster homes, most of which are run by foreigners,
caring for children fostered from state institutions for short or long term treatment and
guardianship. This article focuses solely on the former; see Anna High, China' Orphan
Welfare System: Laws, Poides andFilled Gaps 8 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASJA L. REV. 126
(2013)] for an overview of both types.
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often unacknowledged system of care to the state-operated welfare institutions,
which care for only a small fraction of China's orphans.43
There are no official estimates on the number of unregistered private
orphanages in China. Many are associated with the underground Catholic church;
many have experienced disapproval and harassment from local officials due to the
nature of their work. All of my seven primary case study orphanages (introduced
below) were able to list at least three or four other private orphanages in their
respective provinces of which they were aware, despite the fact that networks of
mutual support among the homes appeared weak to non-existent. My informants
also included two Western individuals, Father Thomas and Charles Kramer, who
represent organisations involved with advocacy and support of Catholic private
orphanages across China -both estimate there are hundreds of orphanages run by
Catholics alone across China. It is clear from my fieldwork that informal orphanage
operations are abundant in the provinces visited, as actual or perceived gaps in
the state's provision of welfare result in efforts to supplement the formal system
with bottom-up, local initiatives. Such private orphanages are very often founded
out of necessity following the discovery of one or more abandoned children in a
particular region. This is particularly typical of church-run orphanages - it is very
common for abandoning parents to leave their children near church buildings,
or for children found in public spaces such as bus stops or by the roadside to be
brought by those who find them to known Christians in the area, in the absence
of state-provided alternatives. Over time, large numbers of foundlings come to be
cared for by overwhelmed parishioners, before being brought together under the
supervision of church leaders for central care. Other orphanages are established
as a planned response to a perceived need in one's community, becoming, over
time and as word spreads, regular recipients of abandoned children.

43

According to Chinese government statistics, as of 2006 there were 573 000 orphaned
children in China, of which 66 000 are in the care of state welfare institutes (Guany

ujiaqinggu'erjiuhugongguode yjian [Joint Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan
Relief], Ministry of Civil Affairs et al. 2006). It may be that the total number of orphans
is under-reported, given that many orphaned and abandoned children, including those
resident in most of the private orphanages interviewed, do not possess hukou [residency
permits] and are thus unlikely to be included in official statistics.
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There appear to be a number of reasons why the children at private
orphanages do not end up being cared for in the state welfare system. Many
rural areas are prohibitively distant from the nearest state orphanage, most of
which are in urban locations, and theoretically only service urban populations.
One of the case study orphanages, Star Village, cares for children of prisoners,
who are, in any case, not eligible for upkeep in welfare institutes. Dr Shang, the
leading scholar on China's vulnerable children, notes that while "theoretically, the
state is the sole welfare provider to vulnerable children in China", at the same
time "state policy in rural areas is not to take direct responsibility for supporting
[vulnerable] children" where, again theoretically, such children are cared for by
"traditional family and kinship networks, and

rubao".44 The actual experience in

rural areas, however, does not always marry to the theory of central policies. Dr
Shang explains that although many rural orphaned children are protected by nubao,
there are a number of deficiencies in the system that render it often ineffectual
and inadequate as a means of care provision.45 KinShip and

nao networks are

proving inadequate to protect rural vulnerable children; in the absence of state
institutions, grassroots private orphanages have therefore evolved to address in
part such inadequacies.

46

3. Methodology and Data
This research project is the culmination of numerous trips to various foster
homes and orphanages in China carried out between 2005 and 2010. Using those
homes as a starting point of contact, the subjects of study were approached
44

Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaoming Wu and Haiyan Li, SodalPokcy, SodalGender and the Problem
of InfantAbandonment in China, YOUTH STUDIES 4, 126 (2005).Nongcunwubao or the 'Five

Guarantees'is a'rural community-based welfare system that provides the five guarantees
of free food, clothes, fuel, health services, and education or funeral arrangements as

45

46

appropriate for the elderly, sick and disabled as well as for orphans who are not only
unable to look after themselves but also have no one legally responsible for their welfare:
Xiaoyuan Shang, Looking for a Better Way to Carefor Children: Cooperation between the State
and CiilSody in China, 76(2) SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW 203, 206 (2002).
Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaming Wu and Yue Wu, Welfare Prodisionfor Vulnerable Children: The
Missing Role of the State, THE CHINA QUARTERLY 122 (2005).
Further, a number of my informants believe that even where a state orphanage is
within reach of an abandoning parent, some are reluctant to leave their children at such
institutions due to a fear of being caught by the state and sanctioned for the crime of
abandonment.
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based on personal introductions. This eventually led to contacts with Chinese-run
orphanages.4 The bulk of my data was gathered on two research trips, in 2009
and 2010.48 The seven case study orphanages which informed the current article
are introduced in the table below.
Pseudonym

Location*

Desejption

Children

Guanghui

Beijing/Hebei

Catholic church-run private
orphanage

90

Our Lady's

Beijing/Hebei

Catholic church-run private
orphanage

113

Good Shepherd

Shanxi

Catholic church-run private

40

orphanage (closed in 2008)

Home of Joy

Shanxi

Church-run private orphanage

75

Rainbow House

Beijing/Hebei

Previously church-run private
orphanage, now recognized by
MCA as official provider in area

79

Star Village

Beijing/Hebei

Part of national network of homes
caring for children of long-term
prisoners

130

Chen Anhui

Anhui

Individual-run private orphanage

200

Following interviews with representatives of various private orphanages in
2009, in 2010 1 spent several weeks each at Guanghui and Our Lady's Home for the
Handicapped, both of which are homes for orphans and foundlings run by nuns
of the unofficial Catholic church, in order to better understand day-to-day life and
the experiences of resident children and sisters. In addition, in-depth interviews
were carried out, on both field trips, with representatives of five other Chinese-run
private orphanages. Home of Joy, Rainbow House and Good Shepherd Home
are also associated with underground churches, although Good Shepherd is no
longer in operation as its managers recently moved to Beijing to pursue a foster
home model. Rainbow House, located in a town very near to Guanghui, is an
47

48

Private Chinese orphanages, and particularly those associated with underground
churches, are, for reasons explored below, very often wary of associations which could
attract the attention of local authorities, making access difficult, and largely dependent on
guanxi (relationships, connections) with trusted, long-standing friends of the orphanage
concerned.
See Appendix A for list of interviews.
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important case study, as the orphanage has succeeded in establishing a partnership
with the MCA, following years of independent, unsupervised operations. The
remaining homes are not connected with religious communities - Star Village is
a home for the children of long-term prisoners, and its founder, Madam Leng,
has actively sought government support and cooperation for many years since
its founding; Chen Anhui is an independent orphanage, supported by a network
of expatriate volunteers.

IV. FINDINGS

- GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE SECTOR

Most Chinese private orphanages operate without formal registration as
charitable organisations or welfare homes, often without legal status and without
any kind of formal state regulation or oversight. Further, they are operating in a
field (privately-run, unregistered institutions for orphans) the legality of which is
ambiguous at best. Dr Shang in We!fare Provisionfor Vulnerable Children cites central
policy as stipulating that only state-run welfare institutes may lawfully care for
orphaned and abandoned children in China, based on an interview with an official

from the Ministry of Civil Affairs.4 9 It is somewhat problematic to make such a
broad statement -'government' is a cumbersome entity in China that does not
always present a unified front. However, certainly the evidence of both Chinese
and foreign informants was that local and provincial level officials frequently refer
to their operations as 'illegal' or 'not allowed', usually on the basis of an assertion
that only the government can care for Chinese orphans.0
An apparent dilemma thus arises. It is beyond the capability of local
governments to take over the responsibility of caring for the children currently
housed in private orphanages. However, the existence of such homes is legally
and, at times, politically problematic. The passive approach of local government
is to ignore the formal legal rules and allow private orphanages to play a role,
often significant, in child welfare. Despite their lack of legal status, complex
transactional relationships exist between local government and the operators of
private orphanages, and the expectations of such operators appear to be met
49
50

Supra note 45, at 122.
For a more comprehensive review of statutory references to the care of orphans, see
[forthcoming UPenn EALR article - Fall 2012].
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fairly regularly, as legal rules are marginalised in favour of informal norms and
processes. A combination of government oversight and back-turning exists in
this regulatory space, widely spoken of in China as the 'one eye open, one eye
closed' approach.
Before presenting the empirical evidence relating to government interaction
with the Chinese private orphanages, the unwieldy and layered character of
Chinese government must be noted, as well as the fact that 'government' is
itself a contentious and ill-defined notion due to the nature of its bureaucracy,
and due to the blurred state/society boundary that the GONGO system entails.
'Government' in China is an exceptionally cumbersome entity, with vast internal
political space. Vertically, such space often results in defacto devolution of central
powers to provincial and local levels, with great variance in implementation
of central policies, including, notably, in relation to regulation of the NGO
sector (birth planning policy implementation is another pertinent example).5
Horizontally, the potential for inconsistency and confusion in relation to policy
and responsibilities among departments and bureaus is great, and the effect of this
confusion at the level of implementation is compounded by the power of central
departments and Party offices to issue circulars with equivalent or superior status
to codified laws.52 In light of such multidimensional space, it is overly reductionist
to construct 'the state' or 'government' as a monolithic and homogeneous entity.
Accordingly, it may be difficult to draw inferences about 'government' attitudes
and intentions. In presenting evidence of discrepancies between law and practice,
and the different experiences of the case studies in their interaction with state
officials, account must be taken of this cumbersome nature of government in
China and the concomitant potential for disconnect and confusion between
different levels of government.
51

SeeKAY

JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON (Yeong&Yeong Book Co.
2004), at 163 (noting how fierce resistance to central birth planning policy at local level

led to marked differences in implementation); and Halyan Li, Xiaoyuan Shang and

Jianpeng Cheng, An Analysis of Reasons Behind the Abandonment of Orphans and Disabled
Children in Bejing (Bejingshi Gucan Ertong Bei Yii De Yuanyin Fenxi), BEIJING SOCIAL
SCIENCES 4, 154-155 (2004).

52

JKWAN CHAN, KING LUN NGOK AND DAVID PHILLIPS, SOCIAL POLICY IN CHINA:
DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING (The Policy Press: Bristol, 2008) at 9; Xiaorong Li,

See CHAK

License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibiity, and Legal Failuresin Chinak
Family-PlanningProgram, 8 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND FEMINISM 145, 150 (1996).
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Turning to the nature of interactions between orphanages and government
officials in particular, one must keep in mind the different priorities and
preoccupations which dominate the different vertical layers of state institutions,
as well as the different political cultures which operate in different localities
across China. For example, Will Peters, an American businessman who founded
a grassroots foster home for Chinese orphans, and has worked extensively with
Catholic orphanages for many years, postulated that the overarching priority of
central government is 'the extent to which they complete the theoretical plan their laws, regulations and policies, even though they are kind of a construct'.
It is arguable, and supported by the empirical findings about the nature of
private orphanage relationships with officials and departments, that the central
government is generally more concerned with appearances, and the symbolism
of a legal /regulatory landscape which ostensibly confines the care of orphans to
state orphanages. We might speculate that such a concern with an appearance of
control over orphanages relates to the potentially high political cost, in terms of
the legitimacy of birth planning policies, that would be involved in acknowledging
activities broadly associated with the problem of infant abandonment, such as
private care of foundlings, or admitting that the problem is of such a scale that
private homes are apparently needed to supplement state welfare.5 4 The rhetoric
of central control over all church and NGO activities would also appear to be in
need of protection. Local officials, on the other hand, seem to be negotiating a
delicate balance between on the one hand the top-down pressure to maintain at
least the appearance of compliance with formal law and policy, and commitment
to the ideas they symbolise, and on the other hand the bottom-up pressure of
pragmatic considerations. 5 The evidence from the field is that there is a broad
correlation between formal registration (dengif/huce) of private orphanages and
engagement with provincial/central level authorities; whereas informal recognition
53

Interview with China Orphan Relief founder/CEO, in Beijing, (Aug 25 2009).

54

The existence of private orphanages is seen by many in the field as a partial testament
to the true extent of abandonment in China, a phenomenon the Chinese government
has a vested interest in underemphasising due to its nexus with China's controversial

55

birth planning policies.
For an excellent sociological account of the resultant "symbiosis" between the state
and grassroots NGOs, see Anthony Spires, Contingent Symbiosis and GCil Sodety in an
AuthoritarianState: Understandingthe Surdivalof Chinak GrassrootsNGOs, 117(1) AMERICAN
J. oF SOCIOLOGY 1 (2011).
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(chengren/renke) and oversight (which encompasses a spectrum of relations from
supportive to hostile, including shutting homes down or heavily impinging their
ability to continue functioning) occurs at the local level. The discussion below is
arranged accordingly.

1. Attitudes to Legality: Ideological and Functional
The recognition/registration distinction was prominent in the discourse of
orphanage operators. It became apparent early on in the field that a legal/illegal
distinction is very rarely drawn in the language used by interviewees, meaning that
the legal/illegal binary presupposed by many studies of China's law/practice gaps
is not entirely apposite in the local Chinese context. Questions about whether
private orphanage work is regarded by those in the field as 'hefa' (compliant with
law), 'fefa' (contrary to law) or having no relation to law would almost always elicit
discussions about the various ways, formal and informal, in which government is
willing to engage with the private orphanages. This appeared indicative of a general
lack of preoccupation with 'legality' in either an empirical or ideological sense,
and was a notable point of contrast with foreign interviewees, who seemed on
the whole more articulate on the issue of legality of non-government orphanage
work. Indeed 'legality' is, empirically, a difficult notion to pin down in this area
of activity, and, given the vague state of the legislative framework relating to
Chinese NGOs, is much more problematic to define here than is often the case
in many Western contexts.
Ideologically, there was a far greater emphasis observable in the field (which
is mirrored in the scholarship of Chinese NGO specialists), on the attainment
of legitimacy than legality. Legitimacy is defined by Gao Bingzhong, an influential
Chinese NGO scholar, as "being recognised or accepted because of being judged
56

In using terms such as 'Western' and 'Chinese', I am in agreement with Diane Hoffman
and Guoping Zhao, who argue that such usage can lead to "unwarranted generalization,
leading to monolithic comparisons that erase internal differences", but that they might
nevertheless be carefully used as 'heuristic devices to illustrate broad cultural contrasts'

(Diane Hoffinan and Guoping Zhao, Global Convergence and Divergencein ChildhoodIdeologies
and the Marginaigationof Children,inEDUCATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE GLOBAL
CULTURE

57

NGOs

3, 3 (Joseph Zajda, Karen Biraimah and William Gaudelli eds., 2008).
ch. 2-7 (Yuwen Li ed., Ashgate, 2011).

IN CHINA AND EUROPE,
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or believed to be in conformity with certain rules". This definition accords
with Suchman's, widely adopted in Western organisational theory scholarship:
"Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions"." Of course, semantically and
conceptually the concepts of legitimacy and legality are closely related, with the
former often being used in a particular sense to mean 'conformable to law' (the
more general sense being 'conformable to rules or standards') - this is also the
case when one considers the Chinese terms for legitimacy, heli and befa, literally
'complying with truth/reason' and 'complying with law' respectively. However
while compliance with legal rules is one aspect of legitimacy, as will be explored
herein, I argue that legality (or what we might call 'legal legitimacy') is not of
central importance vis-a-vis grassroots Chinese NGOs. It is thus useful to
consider other aspects of legitimacy that may not be contingent on or related to
an organisation's legal status. In this vein, Gao helpfully deconstructs legitimacy
into four aspects: political legitimacy, social legitimacy, administrative legitimacy
and legal legitimacy. 9 Political legitimacy depends on the political correctness
of an organisation's agenda and actions. Social legitimacy refers to congruence
with the expectations and norms of society, and accordingly being recognized
and accepted socially. Administrative legitimacy involves being recognised and
accepted by a bureaucratic system, while legal legitimacy denotes recognition and
formalisation through legal institutions (such as, for example, legislation relating
to NGO registration). These are influential interpretive concepts in Chinese NGO
literature, which raises the question of how much value is placed on the various
58
59

Mark Suchman, ManagingLegitimag:Strategic andInstitutionalApproaches, 20(3) ACADEMY
OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 571, 574 (1995).
Bingzhong Gao, The zuestion of Legitimagy of Sodal Organisations,CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCES
2 (2000), translatedin Junkui Han, InternationalNGOs in China: CurrentSituation, Impacts
and Response of the Chinese Government, inNGOs IN CHINA AND EUROPE, 35 (Yuwen Li
ed., Ashgate, 2011). Organisational theory literature includes numerous different
'legitimacy typologies', such as resource /moral /cultural (David Ahlstrom and Gary
Bruton, Learningfrom Successful Local Private Firms in China: EstabishingLegitimag, 15(4)
THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE 72, (2001)) and pragmatic /moral /cognitive
(Suchman, supra note 58). While organisational and business management scholarship
has some relevance to NGO studies, and recognizing the overlap of other legitimacy
'types' with Gao's four categories of legitimacy, Gao's model is adopted herein due to
its proven aptness vis-ii-vis the study of Chinese NGOs.
20

GrassrootsNGO Regulation and China' Local1Lgal Culture

facets of legitimacy, including but not limited to legal legitimacy (or legality), by the
various actors, both state and non-state, at the level of grassroots NGO activity.
The idea of legality as a source of enhanced legitimacy deriving from
some measure of formal, documented interaction with and approval from state
authorities was lacking among Chinese interviewees in the sector; that is to say,
legal legitimacy was not considered a necessary aspect of or precondition to
attaining political, social or administrative legitimacy. On the other hand, many
interviewees would raise the higher normative force of a felt moral calling to care
for orphans, when the legality of their work was discussed - for example: "Home
of Joy is completely faith-based -we operate strongly based on what we believe
in. We want to do what is best for the kids, we're not necessarily trying to get
around the system".o This perhaps indicates that legality is not wholly a matter
of no concern, but rather is subordinated to this more pressing consideration.
None of the interviewees appeared to regard their work as illegal, although all
acknowledged their lack of registration, and, in many cases, recognition, and were
unwilling to state equivocally that their work is approved or permitted:
I don't think thej think about themselves as i/legal. Thej are doing something because the
,government has not arrived to do it themselves. Society has this need, so somebody has to
take over the care of the abandonedchildren, and this was not being done b government.
Sure, the government says that only the state can carefor orphans. But caringforpeople
is not illegal.61
[Sister Qin,founder, when asked ij Guanghui' work is legalSo it is contradictoy...we
hope the Chinese government can soon replace this thought towards this group of people,
we hope thej can really understandthat we are rescuing children... We hope that the laws
will improve and strengthen more and more. Their law says this - that orphanages are
62
governments responsibiit, but implementation is at the grassroots.
[Madam Meng,founder of Huikng Disabiktj Services, on unregisteredNGOs generaly
It' kke the red green/yellow of traffic kghts. We're in the yellow kght zone.'

60
61
62
63

Interview with volunteer coordinator of Home of Joy, in Shanghai, (Oct. 13, 2009).
Interview with Guanghui project manager, in Hebei, (Jul. 9, 2010).
Interviewwith Sister Qing, manager/co-founder of Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
Interview with Madam Meng, Huiling, in Beijing, (Aug 5, 2010).
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When the issue was framed in terms of relationships with state officials, on
the other hand, there was evidence that all interviewees had contemplated the
functional and instrumental consequences of legality/legal status or lack thereof,
both advantageous and otherwise. Broadly, the three main areas in which increased
government engagement with the private orphanages could potentially lead to
changes in operational outcomes are funding, the problem of hukou [residency
permits] for children of unknown parentage, and the regulation of standards of
care. The language used by interviewees is most telling here - generally, the idea
of recognition of their work (chengren) was spoken of as desirable; registration in a
formal/legal sense (dengft/huce) generally was not, and questions about the latter
were often treated as referring to the former. The preoccupation with recognition
seemed to equate with a desire for acknowledgement of the charitable, benevolent
and philanthropic intentions of the homes, the hard work of the volunteers who
staff them, and the general legitimacy of their work despite a lack of 'papers' or
formal association with government. More specifically, most operators expressed
a belief that recognition by local authorities would lead to better financial support,
and assistance in resolution of the hukou issue. 'Registration', on the other hand,
seemed to be tied up with historically problematic relations with 'authority' and
'government', as explained by two foreigners with many years' experience with
the Catholic orphanages:
The sisters are not used to deakng with the people of government. History tells them that
always theYwere abused bygovernment [as Christians].I tell them, butyou are doing social
work -you are taking care of children. You have to be strongerwith them! You have to ask
themfor help. But they are afraidto go to the government, afraidto go to the [GONGO]
Disabi§tyFederation- they're afraidto knock on doors. This story, this histoy, is on their
shoulders. The're so afraid.64
Government is an enemy, because of their control of relgion, rather than a partner in
theirprovisionof services. They're not looking to engage with government. Leave me a/one.
You have nothing to give me except trouble... From a churchpoint of view, there ' no going
to the government askingfor engagement. It' more 'We've identifed a need, we willget on
with it and it won't involve the government."

64
65

Interview with visiting Italian physiotherapist, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 10, 2010).
Interview with Father Thomas, Wagner Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010).
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With two exceptions, the interviewees were noticeably unconcerned with
their lack of legal status, other than insofar as it has an impact on the hukou and
funding issues raised below - this ambivalence is exemplified in the following
quote from Sister Chen at Our Lady's:
Ah, being unregistered...it's not Ake the will say jou're unregistered so we are going to
troubleyou'... it'sjust that sometimes, I feel that the children do not enjoy the rghts the
should enjoy, it seems Ake the are lacking a ittle

Moreover, the language used by many of those homes indicated that increased
government oversight is associated with the imposition of external, hard-tomeet standards, a disincentive to seeking legality. Father Thomas, speaking of
unsupervised Catholic orphanages generally, explained that legality is viewed
as unbeneficial because "[i]t would just be mafan [trouble]. It would give poor
managers more trouble. I don't see how it would be onerous for good managers,
though". Home of Joy, for example, expressed concern about whether 'legalisation'
would be in their best interests, as that would mean many state regulations would
become applicable. Others similarly expressed concern that 'legalisation' could in
fact hinder their ability to carry out their work free from government interference
and regulation - "Operating unregistered works well for us - if we were regulated,
we couldn't do what is needed on the ground. We want to make things happen"."
The only time interviewees expressed concern about the lack of standards of care
in their field of activity was, on occasion, in relation to other homes.
Only two of the homes, Star Village and Guanghui, expressed frustration
regarding their inability to attain registration. Given that the other homes perceived
a connection between registration and the imposition of external standards, it is
relevant that both Star Village and Guanghui also expressed greater confidence
in their standards of care and transparency of operations. Star Village referred
to this as a 'self-discipline' issue - given the organisational and administrative
capacity of this national movement, it is unsurprising that they did not believe
registration would greatly impact on their work (other than perhaps by enhancing
their social legitimacy, and thus assisting with community fundraising efforts).
66
67

Interview with Sister Chen, co-founder of Our Lady's, in Hebei, (Jul. 21, 2010).
Interview with volunteer coordinator, Chen Anhui, in Shanghai, (Oct. 4, 2009).
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2. Central and Provincial Regulation (Formal)
'Ourgovernment, they won't acknowledge us. We go and knock on doors, but not a single
department will actfor us. They will notpay us any attention. They say it wouldgive them
too much trouble'."

Dr Shang uses Guanghui as an example of the difficulties faced by Chineserun private orphanages in achieving formal registration. Although established in
1988, itwas not until 1994 that an incoming director decided to address Guanghui's
lack of legal status (and the attendant lack of hukou for resident children - below)
by seeking registration:
Since 1994, NunQin has written more than 70 letters to severalgovernmentdepartments:
civil affairs (minheng), rehgion (Zongliao), unitedfront (tong Zhang), pubkc security
(gongan), poktical consultative conference (Zhengxie) and people' congresses (renda), at
different levels. Most departmentswerefriendy andsympathetic to her efforts. Howeverfor
vanous reasons, none of them had the power to give the home aformal registrationwithin
the current legalframework, which stoulates that ony government organisationshave the
nght to run children' homes and that it is illegalforprivate individuals and organisations
to run such faciRties. Children caredfor ly [Guanghuil have to grow up withoutformal
registration. The oldest 'child' in the home is now 20, but he still cannot obtain aformal
registration(hukou). Nun Qin has also tried to argue with the local civilaffairsdepartment
that it cannot give her home legal status, the government should take over the home and
look after the children. This suggestion was gnored.Although both the local government
and the church know that [Guanghuilhas no legal status, the localgovernment has no
intention of closing it or taking over its administration.To assume responsibilitythe local
9
government would have to provide caring services to 87 disabled children.

f

Although the practical ramifications of operating as a non-entity are
significant, among the seven Chinese private orphanages interviewed, five have
no recognised legal personality in China. Father Thomas and Charles Kramer,
familiar with the majority of church-based orphanages in Eastern China, both
report that none of which they know have been able to attain registration. Only
Rainbow House and Star Village have any formal legal status in China, and of
the remaining homes, only Guanghui has actively sought registration, which is
68
69

Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
Shang, Wu and Wu, supranote 45, at 131.
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reflective of the generally ambivalent attitude to 'legality' observed in the sector.
In none of the cases was government approval sought as a precursor to beginning
orphanage operations. Rather, attention to formal permission and sanction of
operations, if given, was always an afterthought, often given only after years of
operation demonstrated the practical shortcomings of working outside of the
state welfare system. Star Village, which has all but given up on NGO registration
and is instead registered as a commercial enterprise, indicated that it was only
after many years of operating as a non-entity that they turned their attention to
'legalising' operations by obtaining some sort of official status in China; Rainbow
House, similarly, struck up a partnership with government after two years of
operating as a non-entity.
Central policy on the establishment of private orphanages is, as introduced
above, ambiguous at best, and complicated in the case of church-based
orphanages, where in many cases the legal status of the associated church is itself
questionable.70 Dr Shang's statement that only state-run institutions may lawfully
care for abandoned and orphaned children in China must be qualified, in light
of the Social Welfare Institutions Interim Measures, which appear to provide a
mechanism for privately-run orphanages to be established on condition of being
granted a 'certificate of approval'.72 Further, given the lack of a definitive, express
prohibition on caring for orphans privately, it would appear that a second pathway
70

A large number of Chinese private orphanages are run by the Catholic church, which
experienced decades of persecution and suppression under Mao's rule following the
founding of the PRC. The Vatican, during this time, called for the faithful in China to
resist cooperation with the newly established Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association
(the only state-approved meeting of Catholics, and the leaders of which denounced
the Vatican), meeting in unapproved congregations in houses across China. In this
way, the 'underground' Catholic church evolved. The public /underground distinction
which originated during Mao's rule continues today, although in a blurrier manner,
and is mirrored in the Protestant church system. See,further, RICHARD MADSEN, CHINA'S
CATHOLICS: TRAGEDY AND HOPE IN AN EMERGING CIVIL SOCIETY (U. of California Press,

1998); Fenggang Yang, The Red, Black and Grey Markets of Rekgion in China, 47
SOCIOLOGICAL

71
72

Q.

THE

93 (2006).

Shehuifubjigouguan/ikanxingbanfa[Social Welfare Institutions Interim Measures], Ministry
of Civil Affairs, (Dec. 30, 1999).
Id. art. IX, although it is difficult to state definitively whether, on obtaining a certificate
of approval under the Measures, the home is then still considered to be independent, or
effectively becomes appropriated into the state system, as the experience of Rainbow
House demonstrates (below).
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to formal recognition for Chinese operators exists, namely that of registering as a
Private Non-Enterprise Unit (PNEU). However, for the time being, registration
following either pathway is not a realistic option for most private orphanages, with
the obstacles to both types of formal approval being closely related. The first and
most immediate barrier is that of securing the cooperation and assistance of a
government department. At some point, an applicant orphanage must obtain the
agreement of a government department to act as a professional supervising unit
(PSU - colloquially known as a >opo' or mother-in-law) and to take on political,
as well as some degree of financial, responsibility for the actions and work of the
orphanage in question. This has proved impossible for many private orphanages,
due to their lack of political capital and financial resources. Secondly, in addition
to the PSU/supervising department problem, both the Social Welfare Institutions
Interim Measures, and the PNEU Regulation, include what in practice amount
to minimum capital requirements which must be met.74 Other than Rainbow
House, which appears to enjoy relative financial stability through private donors,
none of the interviewed orphanages are able to meet the financial criteria. A
third barrier to registration is the lack of administrative capacity to comply with
the procedures and conditions - indeed, many of the orphanages were unaware
of official processes for registration, let alone of how they might go about an
application (this is unsurprising given both the ambiguity of government policy
in the sector, and the administrative isolation of the rural homes themselves).
This last point is also made by Saich in relation to Social Organisations, noting
that bottom-up initiatives by "poorer sectors of society" are hampered by the
NGO laws, which make registration "difficult for those groups that lack good
connections and a relatively sophisticated organisational apparatus".71
Although Rainbow's manager, Mrs Moses, was unclear about under which
state policy or measure their approval was granted, given that the relationship is
with the MCA, it is likely that it was formalised according to the Social Welfare
Institutions Interim Measures or a related implementing/ subordinate regulation.
This has led to their registration (.huce), something none of the other homes have
73

Supra note 39. PNEU are defined as social organizations carrying out social service
activities of a non-profit nature: Minbanfeiqyedanweidengiguandianxingtiaoi[Provisional

Regulation on Registration and Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units], (Sep.
74
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25, 1998), art. 2.
Supra, note 71, art VII; and supra, note 73, art 8.
Saich, supra note 37, at 132.
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been offered or able to achieve. Mrs Moses relates the evolution of her orphanage's
ties with government as eventually progressing from a relationship of suspicion
and wariness, to one of support and trust:
It is run ly the church, but we have receivedvey offdiialgovernmentapprovalandrecognition.
The saw ourgood work, the rescue effort, that we he/p so many children, and our good
operations,and now our relationshp with the government is espedaly good...
... At first, the government did not understand our work, because it was a Christian
orphanage.So the had opinions about this, andwere alwas calng on us [to ask questions],
and when we started up it was ver dfficult, there was a lot of misunderstanding. It was
veg difficult to do our work in theface of this opposition.As a new orphanageyoucouldn't
yet see our achievements, we only had afew children. But slowl'y the came to feel that we
were caringfor the children veg we/I. Step by step, the began to see that our work was of
hzgh quay, that we were he/ping to transform the children lves, and so over time, the
relationshpimproved. The currently are veg supportive of us caring or even more children
at the orphanage. The [local authorities]do not have any way of rescuing these stray
children, the can only rely on our home. And the see that if these children were outside
of ourhome, lving as strays, this would be a vey bzg problemforthe communiy. Currently
[our cig] only has our orphanage, there is no government orphanage, so the support us a
lot - the Public Securiy Bureau, the CivilAffairs Bureau, the government officials, the
are all extremely supportive, and hope we can continue to he/p even more children.

Government support of Rainbow House appears to be limited in practice.
Financially, government grants are nominal, and cover the living costs of roughly
one child per year. However a number of important local officials provide
private donations to Rainbow House, and photos of such officials posing with
the children they sponsor are displayed prominently in Rainbow House's foyer.
This is a telling indication of the most valuable aspect of Rainbow House's ties
with government, the security and social capital/practical advantages the home
derives from its personal relationships orguanxiwith local authority figures, and
their public endorsement of the home's work. Mrs Moses spoke proudly of the
visits Rainbow House receives from such officials, and the strings they will pull for
the home (for example, calling local schools to ensure the children are admitted).
The other major advantage of state approval is that the home itself has a hukouor
household registration, and thus is itself, in effect, a legal entity. This means that
when children arrive at Rainbow without hukou, they can be registered with the
Bureau of Household Registration under the home's hukou.
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Star Village, the home for children of prisoners (which is not affiliated with a
church), has applied annually for fourteen years to its provincial MCA for registration
as a charity, but has been unable to find a PSU willing to support its application.
Guanghui faces the same obstacle, and Sister Qin, its manager, also expressed
frustration and resignation at the government's unwillingness to act as PSU:
We have been to them many times about this, but theyjust think it is too much trouble - the
don't want to supervise us. So we are caringfor so many children, and every day we have to
contend with so many issues, and wejust don't have the energy any more.76

The solution at Star Village has been to register as a commercial entity,
something which is clearly incongruous but reportedly a very common creative
alternative to achieving an operating structure conducive to the needs of a
charitable organization. In 2005, for example, the Tsinghua University NGO
Research Centre estimated there were between 100 000 and 200 000 NGOs
registered with the various State Administration of Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) bureaus nationwide.7 Anecdotally, the Chinese government is well aware
of the trend, and some interviewees consider commercial registration an advantage
not only for practical reasons relating to banking, visas and finance, but also
because business is 'a language the Chinese understand', 8 the implication being
that philanthropy and charity is still widely regarded with suspicion in Chinese
society. Commercial registration is often more convenient than acting as a nonentity, and provides at least a veneer of legitimacy to an organization by vesting
it with legal personality. However such organisations are clearly acting outside
the mandate of their SAIC licenses, and possibly in violation of policies and
laws relating to the care of orphans, meaning it is difficult to say whether such
an approach renders the private orphanage in question any more 'lawful' than an
orphanage operating as a non-entity.
Interviewees agreed that finding a PSU is difficult for private orphanages,
but attributed this to different factors. Star Village's campus director, a retired
76
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Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co -founder of Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
Tina Qian and Nick Young, Rule on Names Starts to Close Door to NGO '"Businesses" CHINA
DEVELOPMENT BRIEF, http://www.chinadevelopmentbriefcom/node/74

(last accessed

Jan. 14, 2010).
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Interview with Chinese lawyer for foreign foster homes, in Beijing, (Sep. 5, 2009).
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Chinese army officer, believes their inability to find a PSU department relates to
the fact that children of prisoners, unlike orphans, are not a recognised class of
welfare recipients; however generally (with the exception of Rainbow House), the
orphanages which do care for orphans and foundlings have had no more success
than Star Village in securing registration. It appears that, apart from the fact that
many orphanage operators themselves do not regard the pursuit of registration
(or indeed informal recognition) as a priority, registration prospects depend on the
mafan (trouble /burden /labour) which potential supervisory departments believe
would result from formalising their oversight of the sector.
A number of factors are relevant here: the case of Rainbow House
demonstrates that where an orphanage is providing high-quality care for children

in a transparent way, and provided that the home is demonstratively financially
independent, and provided further that the department concerned is not
threatened or wary of the home's operators for reasons relating to religious or
political activities, it could in fact be politically favourable for such an orphanage
to be formally recognized, and a partnership struck up, in response to needs left
partially unaddressed by state-provided social welfare. The provincial MCA in
Zhengmin, where Rainbow House is located, has effectively appropriated the
work and outcomes of Rainbow House, and the political benefits thereof, without
concomitantly incurring any additional financial burden, and very little supervisory
responsibility or accountability.
The perceived standard of care being provided by various unregistered
orphanages would thus seem to be a key factor in the registration prospects
thereof, even beyond the obvious connection between care standards and the
orphanage's ability to meet the capital requirements. Charles Kramer, an Italian
charity worker with many years of experience aiding church-based private
orphanages in improving their care standards, believes such standards are central
to understanding state-orphanage relations, or lack thereof:
The government should somehow recognise the sector, but I can also see thefearof government
in managing structures that are very poorly run. How can the present themselves to the
outside world, and say 'this is recognised', but leave the children in these conditions?...
You can understandgovernment somehow now - if they registerthese private homes, they
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have to guaranteethe are doing the rght thing. So the; have to /nd a way - to close, or to
allow registration.Registration means more responsibi/itfor government in terms of the
practicesin these homes.79
If the government registeryou,youbecome their responsibiy. But ifyou're not registered,
the; can say 'Oh it' fine,you can't blame me, it' not my responsibilit that things have
gone wrong".
There is an obvious problem in a regulatory system in which those
organisations providing the best quality care, and thus in less need of supervisory,
technical and financial support, are 'legalised', and those in which standards are
low, and mortality rates high, are permitted to continue operating 'under the
radar', but this appears to be the state of the Chinese private orphanage system. 8'
Of course, the religious proclivities and history of the associated church are also
factors in the development of orphanage-state relations, however the experience
of Rainbow House, also run by a church organisation, demonstrates that this
is not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to formal registration. What seems
more pivotal is the balance of, on the one hand, the political 'face' to be gained by
adding well-run, relatively good-quality institutions to a provincial MCA bureau's
portfolio, and the administrative burden and political risk of taking on some
degree of responsibility for the work thereof. Added to this is the potential for
financial claims to be made upon a department which has granted approval to
run an orphanage. Although Rainbow House, despite being registered for almost
ten years, does not rely on government funds to continue its work, a number of
other unsuccessful applicants attributed government's unwillingness to oversee
their work in part to an unwillingness to incur potential financial liability for their
resident children. 82
79

Ibid.
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Interview with Beijing Normal University researcher, in Beijing, (Aug. 5, 2009).
A recent study of 'black' (unregistered) schools for children of migrants in Beijing
reports a similar conundrum faced by such schools. The vast majority are unable to
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be registered as private schools, due to sub-standard conditions, but are unable to
access funding to improve those conditions due to their lack of registration: Charlotte
Goodburn,Learningfrom MigrantEducation:A Case Study of the Schoodng of RuralMigrant
Childrenin Befing, 29 INTERNATIONALJOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 415 (2009).
Interview with co-managers, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010); see also
interviews with Our Lady's, Will Peters and Mercy House.
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The political costs and benefits of registration are, of course, bound to vary
greatly across and within provinces, depending on the combination of a number
of factors. Regional emphasis on central policies is inconsistent across China, and
appears to depend to a large extent on existing deficiencies in state provision of
welfare at the provincial and local level, and the political and social pressure (or lack

thereof) experienced by officials in relation to such shortcomings. Some provincial
authorities were clearly much more willing than others to engage, in principle,
with the private sector in the provision of orphan services. This willingness often
relates back, in turn, to the 'flavour of the times' of central policy and aspects of
local political culture that may impact on interpretation of these central policy
shifts. For example, in the flurry of activity that occurred after the Blue Sky
Plan" was promulgated, central policy was that state-run welfare institutions
were to be increased in number, improved, expanded and, importantly, filled, 84
which in some provinces resulted in large numbers of orphans being removed
from privately run institutions. In other provinces, local officials apparently chose
to maintain informal cooperation with and tolerance of non-state institutions,
contrary to central policy. Most commonly raised by interviewees as relevant to
their registration failures were religious freedom (including the history of the
local state's dealings with religious groups) and the related issue of the 'social
capital' (that is, the value of one's various social relations and networks) of the
orphanage's founders, operators, supporters and associates (the director of the
Shandong Charity Federation admitted in interview that registration prospects are
essentially dependent on having a 'close relationship with government').85 These

factors are also highly relevant to interactions between local government and the
orphanages, and are explored further below.
83

In June 2006, President Hujintao, while visiting a state orphanage, called for all children
to be able to develop equally under the same blue sky, with orphans benefiting from
the same opportunities as other children. In response and as a means of implementing
Hu's call, the MCA soon after issued the Blue Sky Implementation Plan. The five-year
program, commencing in 2006, aimed to invest central and local government funding
in the construction of new state orphanages and the improvement of existing state
orphanages across China. See Nationwide Plan for Better Care of Orphans, CHINA
DAILY, Dec. 29, 2006; Ertongfubjigoujianshelantianjihuashishifang'an
[Child Welfare Institute

Blue Sky Construction Plan Implementation Program], (Jan. 22, 2007).
84
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Interview with Beijing Normal University researcher, in Beijing, (Aug. 5, 2009).
Interview with Xi ileming, Director, Shandong Charity Federation, in Jinan, (Sep. 21,
2009).
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In addition to the cost/benefit evaluation of registration, it must also be
added that it is possible that the continual refusal experienced by the applicant
private orphanages is at least partly a result of the horizontal space within the
Chinese government, and the intersection of different portfolio interests in the
running of the orphanages. This is particularly the case for orphanages run by
local Catholic factions that themselves have a problematic history of government
relations. Sister Qin believes, for example, that the MCA is wary of taking on
responsibility for Guanghui through registration at least partly because traditionally
oversight of the underground Catholic church in their county is within the
mandate of the Religious Affairs Bureau; the Religious Affairs Bureau, on the
other hand, is reportedly unwilling to oversee child welfare work, which comes
under the MCA's ambit.k6 Whether it is genuinely unclear which department has
responsibility to begin overseeing the operations of private orphanages, or whether
this intersection of interests is a useful political tool for denying registration, is
necessarily a matter of speculation; it seems likely that there could be some degree
of truth in both assertions.

3. Local Oversight (Informal)
Just as studies suggest that the majority of NGOs in China are operating
outside of the supervisory framework of the MCA and PSU system,8 so too
examples of formal registration and oversight of private grassroots orphanages are
rare. However, turning to the interface of local government and rural society/local
operations, it is, of course, difficult to care for more than a handful of children
without attracting some government attention. Of the Chinese private orphanages
interviewed, while Rainbow House has successfully established a partnership with
the MCA, the remainder are operating quasi-legally as either unregistered or, in
the case of Star Village, commercially-registered NGOs. While Shang cites central
policy as prohibiting private institutional care of orphans, the evidence from the
case studies was that all Chinese private orphanages have some dealings with
local state officials and authorities. It is difficult to make generalisations about the
nature of informal interactions between local authorities and unregistered private
86
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Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co -founder of Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
See, e.g., Saich, supranote 37; Ashley and He, supra note 37.
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orphanages; the nature of these interactions varies dramatically from case to case
and over time, and it would be unhelpful to attempt to mark definitively the line
between formal and informal recognition by local government (a distinction
interviewees were generally uninterested in making). Some interactions would
seem to indicate approbation, at the local level, of the orphanages' self-directed
and self-financed supplementation of state welfare. In other cases, homes are
operating for many years in the face of regular threats from local officials to
remove the children from their care due to such work being 'not allowed', threats
which have been carried through in other cases. 88
Guanghui, Our Lady's and Good Shepherd all expressly referred to their
work as being 'recognised' (chengren/renke) in some way by local authorities; the
remaining interviewees were generally equivocal, when asked, as to whether the
home in question is recognised by local authorities. However, most also related
stories during the course of interviews which would seem to indicate that their
work is observed, and in some cases tacitly encouraged, by local authorities. Many
placed great importance on examples of informal support from local officials, for
example the giving of gifts at Chinese festivals, and arranging for school admission
or Bureau of Household Registration assistance with hukous. Most notable were
cases where children were being placed into the private home's care by local police
or township officials themselves. For example, Our Lady's was founded in 1993
by Sister Chen. Until three years ago, there was no state welfare institution in the
city in which Our Lady's is located, and it was not uncommon for foundlings to
be brought to Our Lady's by police and MCA officials alike. However, the home
receives no funding from the MCA, and has never been subject to inspections.
Sister Chen spoke of their work as being given the 'green light' in 1993, in what
appears to have been an informal understanding with the city's leadership that they
would not object to the planned use of the church land, provided the orphanage
agreed not to approach the officials for funding. However, she also acknowledged
that the status of Our Lady's is not clear:
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Interviews: Project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 9,2010); Father Thomas, Wagner
Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010); founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing,
(Aug 25, 2009).
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Inprinqjle,I think the government recognises us. If they did not, they would have the rght
to ban our work. Because they'e accepted us, it amounts to them agreeing to let us carry
on. It'just that rght now they haven'tgiven us registration.

The home was visited by government officials once, at the time of its
founding, and according to Sister Chen has been able to continue operating with
the 'trust of the government and the MCA since that time - 'We're able to just
look after the children'.
I was also made aware of other orphanage operators who are exceptionally
good at negotiating local state relations, and have, as a result, been able to enter
into (unwritten) arrangements whereby their orphanage is recognized as a town's
orphan care provider in the absence of state-run facilities:
That deal was brokered by him agreeing to take on the burden of running andfunding
the orphanage, in exchangefor them [town authorities]making him legal. He got the deal
because he knows how to play ball. He became friends with the local officials, and they
knew they could work with him - he wouldgo out and drink and smoke with them. They
knew he was not a risk to theirpromotion - if anything, he was afeather in their cap.89

Star Village, which is currently registered as a commercial enterprise, is another
example of the blurry distinction between recognition and non-recognition. The
organization was for some time registered as a not-for-profit 'research institute'
under the umbrella of a GONGO, the China Charity Federation (CCF), although
not registered with the MCA. A change in CCF leadership led to the Star Village
project being cancelled by the CCF, and Star Village's leadership decided to
register instead with the SAIC. However, they have maintained an arrangement
with the CCF under which they are able to receive domestic donations tax-free.
I expressed surprise that Star Village is, in this sense, recognised as not-for-profit
by one branch of government but denied charitable status by the MCA. The
managing director agreed the situation is 'puzzling and complex ... but it's not
surprising - in China there is a long distance between law and reality'.9 o
Interviewees from other orphanages reported little to no interaction with
local authorities. For these homes, their relationships with the local state are most
89
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Interview with founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, (Aug. 9, 2010).
Interview with manager, Star Village, in Beijing, (Aug 20, 2009).
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notable for being absent, and the most important gift from local officials is 'to be
left alone'. This apathetic attitude on the part of local authorities was explained
by the volunteer coordinator for Home of Joy:
The local bureau is fully aware of us - but theirfirst prioty is always the economic
development of [our ciy]. If anything can benefit that, they will do it. The work of Home
of jy isjust not on theirpioriyAst, they don't have the mindset or time to care aboutsuch
a minorproblem. They know aboutJoy' existence, but they don't really exist on paper.So
there are no checking or standardsimposed."

The experience of Good Shepherd and Chen Anhui was similar: 'They
didn't give us any trouble, although they also didn't give us any help'; 92 'We try
to get forgiveness rather than permission, to do things slowly and quietly rather
than making a noise. Politics is not our concern - just nice and gently, helping
the children'.93 Such homes are not beyond the sight of local authorities, and all
report having at least one or two unannounced visits by town authorities, usually
at the beginning of the home's history, apparently to ensure that the homes are
not being used, for example, for child labour or trafficking. For Home of Joy,
Good Shepherd and Chen Anhui, such surprise inspections came to an end once
a degree of certainty and predictability has been reached after some years of
uneventful operations.
In other cases, tacit approval is absent, and the relationship is better described
as one of hostility and antagonism. Given that the presence of a foreigner in the
rural villages where most orphanages are located would be highly unlikely to go
unnoticed, the orphanages which were willing to host me were naturally those
with some measure of perceived security in terms of their dealings with local
authorities. However, most interviewees were able to speak at length about the
hostility experienced by many unregistered orphanages in their dealings with local
authorities. Home of Joy experienced a number of police 'raids' when it began
operating, which continued for many years. These would consist of unannounced
inspections of their grounds, and threats to remove the children from their care;
91

Interview with volunteer coordinator, Home of Joy, in Shanghai, (Oct. 13, 2009).
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Interview with co-managers, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010).
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Interview with volunteer coordinator, Chen Anhui, in Shanghai, (Oct. 4, 2009).
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the orphanage's volunteer coordinator spoke of these raids as ceasing when the
police 'realised we're just trying to help the kids'. The relationship has evolved into
one of apparent approval, with many of Home of Joy's children being brought
to their doors by local police themselves. Charles Kramer, who is familiar with
many of China's Catholic orphanages, knows of two at which the threat to shut
down operations has in fact been caried out, and believes in both cases this
related to 'the religion factor'. In others, local officials simply make life difficult,
for example an orphanage in a village not far from Guanghui has reportedly been
'under surveillance' for some months now, with authorities preventing visitors,
including medical volunteers, from entering the home, a restriction which heavily
impacts on the home's ability to provide quality care to its resident children. 94
Given the pma fade power imbalance in favour of state officials over
orphanage operators, it may seem surprising that more orphanages are not being
shut down. However, a closer look must be taken at this presumed imbalance,
keeping in mind the vertical space in Chinese government. On-the-ground
interaction and informal oversight of the private orphanages is occurring at
the interface of local government with society, and most often does not accord
with central policies: as Sister Qin of Guanghui observes, 'Their law says this
- that orphanages are government's responsibility; but implementation is at the
grassroots'.9 The difficulties of attaining formal provincial or central approval for
the private provision of orphan services have been discussed above. However the
incentives for allowing unregistered homes to continue, with varying degrees of
recognition by and interaction with local officials, would seem to be most keenly
felt at the local level. While low-level officials seem reluctant to formalise private
operations for reasons congruent with those at higher levels of government
(namely ambiguous policies, and the financial/political risks of endorsing nonstate homes), Shang makes the point that in most rural areas it would also be
"beyond [their] capability... to take over the responsibility of supporting all the
children who need protection" were the children to be removed from private
care. This view which was echoed by many interviewees:
94
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Interview with visiting physiotherapist, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 10, 2010).
Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
Shang, Wu and Wu, supranote 45, at 132.
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Groups kke usface hardship in doing this work, but we do it very well, and havepersisted
for a very long time... Society cannot do without these social service groups, because the
government service organisationsare unable to undertake the care of all such children as
these, they depend on society... Societ needsprivatey-run organisationsto stand infor the
gaps in government services, to assist the vulnerablegroups'.9

This lack of local capacity is also, of course, what leads to the emergence of
private orphanages, to fill gaps in government welfare provision.
A related factor at play at the local level is the importance of guanxi in Chinese
culture; many of the homes appear to be very good at building connections with
officials which potentially go some way in preventing trouble. Many report a steady
improvement in relations with local authorities over years or decades of work,
and the emergence of a relationship commonly described as 'one eye open, one
eye closed'," for example:
The government in its speech and in its tone does not want to be asprovocative aspreviousy
'Your work is illegal!'- at the very least they recognise that the work we do is charitable
work, they are not using the same inhuman words of before. Now they recognise that we
are doing charitable work, there is at least some verbal acceptance of it in their language.

The nature of an orphanage's relationship with local authorities is also
reflected in the willingness of orphanage operators to approach authorities for
assistance, and appears largely dependent on the social capital of its founders
(that is, in the case of homes such as Guanghui, Our Lady's and Good Shepherd,
the associated church leaders) vis-a-vis the local state, which in turn is affected by
a number of factors that vary with time and from place to place. These include,
most notably, the political liberalism of the region, attitudes to/tolerance of
'grey market' religious organisations (themselves of questionable legal status),
the expression of political views or advocacy activities of the orphanage and its
associates, and association with foreigners.
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Interview with manager, Star Village, in Beijing, (Aug 20, 2009).See,further, interviews
with Father Thomas (Aug. 11, 2010), Guanghui project manager Oul. 9, 2010), Sister
Qin, Guanghui Oul. 13, 2010).
Interviews with project manager, Guanghui; manager/founder, Guanghui, manager,
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Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
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Our Lady's, co-managers, Good Shepherd, and manager, Star Village.
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A number of foreigners with long-standing associations with various Catholic
private orphanages across China believe that the ability to 'play ball' with local
authorities, and garner support and recognition of the orphanage's work, is out
of reach for the majority of grassroots operators, due to a lack of administrative
capability, it being self-evidently difficult to convince local officials that a decision
to publicly support and endorse one's work is politically safe when the organisation
lacks transparency, internal standards, staff training programs and adequate
finances.'o For homes such as Guanghui, where the associated local church has
had a lengthy antagonistic relationship with local authorities, their political clout
in terms of fighting for registration is low.
This lack of social capital manifests in a sentiment of disempowerment
evident in all interviews with homes that have sought recognition and/or
registration:
Evey da we're chasing the government to theirgate, and every daj lookingfortheirsupport,
and really, we used to go to them all the time. And now we are simpy exhausted. We don't
want to go again. We don'thave the energy to waste time on this relationshowith government.
And so we arejust drifting along. If we havefood to eat tomorrow, then thatsfne.10 1

The quote shows the 'us /them' binary around which the Catholic nuns I met
seem to have organised their lives, a binary which may be reinforced by the maleofficials /female-caregivers dichotomy. Astute players are able to contrive ways of
enhancing their bargaining power or social capital with authorities - for example,
by displaying prominent pictures of officials who have visited or sponsored their
children, 02 or by having recourse to media and publicity to garner public support
and avoid being shut down.0 3
The Catholic interviewees all noted a correlation between the easing of
religious restrictions over the years, and tolerance and informal support of
their orphan work. Many stated that they believe religion is the 'main factor' in
100 Charles Kramer (project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei, Jul. 9 2010) and Will Peters
(founder/CEO of China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, Aug 9 2010).
101 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
102 E.g. Home of Joy; Star Village.
103 Interview with co-founders, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010).
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determining the nature of their relationship with government. This does not,
as one might expect, mean adopting an irreligious approach to child care - the
children at Rainbow House, the registered home, as well as the unregistered
Guanghui, Our Lady's, and Good Shepherd, are all brought up in the Catholic
faith, attending mass and prayers once or twice daily, and, in the case of older and
capable children, Sunday school in their villages. Jiemin, a sister at Guanghui, noted
that the tolerance experienced by Guanghui and its diocese in relation to their
religious upbringing of the children, and outreach in the village, is not necessarily
experienced in other provinces: 'You can't do this in other places - but here, the
government has considerable confidence and does not interfere too much. They
have one eye open and one closed, knowing we won't cause much trouble. So we
don't have many restrictions imposed on us'.10 4
Interestingly, almost all Chinese interviewees spoke with a large measure of
confidence in their continued ability to care for children outside the formal state
welfare system, despite many having experienced threats and scoldings from local
officials over the years. However, it would appear that such approbative, informal
relationships are not necessarily entirely secure, and that despite the trouble and
financial burden which would be incurred were local officials to decide to shut
down private homes (some of which, it must be noted, are caring for many
hundreds of children), this is a burden which has on occasion (albeit rarely) been
willingly incurred - Father Thomas, after relating some examples of this to me,
said of the Catholic orphanages generally, 'They get a fairly long leash, but will
be reeled in if it comes to their attention as less than helpful'.0 5 Certain patterns
of behaviour in the sector are perhaps telling of a continued awareness of some
degree of vulnerability. For example, most Catholic homes do not welcome foreign
visitors, and none of the private orphanages are engaged in advocacy, activities
which would presumably be sanctioned for the potential attention drawn to the
gap in Chinese social welfare they fill which officially does not exist. Importantly,
many Christian interviewees attributed any feelings of tenuousness regarding
their home's security to a history of antagonism and, at times, persecution of the
associated church by officials.
104 Interview with visiting teacher, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
105 Father Thomas, Wagner Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010).
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OF FINDINGS

This study has presented evidence of a spectrum of regulation and oversight,
from formal to informal, broadly correlating with central momentum toward
acquisition and registration of homes, and local impetus for informal oversight
and recognition. Over time, an equilibrium has been reached involving incongruity
between central laws and policies, and daily life in the towns and villages in
which the orphanages, and the local officials who deal with them, are located.
Local officials continue to take a 'one eye open, one eye closed' approach to the
sector. On the part of the operators of orphanages, there seems generally a lack
of concern with legality, law and registration procedures, with some exceptions,
and no expectation that interactions with officials will be guided by law or the
principle of equality before the law. All in all, the state-orphanage dynamic across
the case studies can be characterised as paternalistic and disciplinarian, involving
'game-playing' and cautious pushing of boundaries overtime. The majority of the
case orphanages prefer to seek recognition of the important charitable nature of
theirworkwhen this is seen as a potential means of garnering legitimacy on which
to base arguments for occasional or regular practical support, rather than legality
as a means of checking local power or on which to base requests for assistance.
There is little momentum for sector-wide advocacy, and no networks of mutual
endeavours for standardisation, expansion or political prioritisation of orphan
welfare. The homes are generally inward-focused, with an air of ambivalence or
resignation vis-a-vis the current state of the sector.
There seemed to be no expectation, on either side of the state-society
relationship, that the relationship would be shaped, constrained or governed by
formal legal rules or law (except in cases where informal rules were pushed or
broken, in which case a show of state power would be anticipated). In fact, looking
at the general expectations, understandings and meanings held by actors in the
field, the sector appears notably 'non-legal' in nature, with informal relationships
trumping formal structures. While there was variance among interviewees as
to whether law should be available as a standard to be invoked in dealings with
officials, there was uniformly an expectation that law, rather than constraining
and standardising both sides of the state-society equation, would instead only

40

GrassrootsNGO Regulation and China' LocalfLgal Culture

be used as a tool by local officials if needed to supplement informal processes
of negotiation and paternalistic exercise of discretion. This finding challenges
law-centric assumptions about the maintenance of state-society relationships,
but was not treated as at all unexpected by Chinese interviewees, who commonly
evinced a perception of the government as deliberately taking a 'one eye open,
one eye closed' approach to many areas of regulation. In the resultant, at-times
ambiguous, regulatory landscape, demarcations between lawful and unlawful,
tolerance and promotion of social fields beyond the reach of the law, become
somewhat unclear. This seems to have resulted in, at times, very effective local
government oversight of a supposedly non-legal sector, which is allowed to exist
and grow, albeit cautiously and accompanied by a large degree of self-censorship.
The extra-legal norms, relationships and processes were generally spoken of as
affording players in this field some sense of security, certainty, and an ability to
negotiate in a somewhat predictable and ordered manner. On the other hand there
was a widespread acceptance that doing charitable work in China on the margins
of an ambiguous legal landscape, at least for now, necessarily requires tolerance
of an on-going sense of vulnerability to the caprice of both local and central
government, and subject to discipline if boundaries are pushed too far. This state
of affairs, with aspects of security and insecurity, confidence and vulnerability,
was widely accepted by my informants as an inevitable feature of doing such
politically contentious work.

1. Legitimacy, Legality and the Role of Law
This is a system in which administrativeresourcesand mechanisms andpersonaltiespla a
greaterrole than laws in shaping the negotiatingenvironment. It is a sstem that on the one
hand allows a great deal of flexibilit in terms of how pocies and laws are implemented,
but on the other hand can be arbitrarjand capricious.In other words, behaviour in this
system is guided more ly administrativerank and control over resources, and the fear of
state reprisal,than ly [legal rules.10

Given the dynamic and unclear state of the legal landscape, it is unsurprising
that the touchstone for NGO security and capability in the case sector appears
to be legitimacy and not legality. The longevity and success of actors in the field
106 Shawn Shieh, Beyond Corporatism and Cidil Sodey: Three Modes of State-NGO Interaction
in China, in STATE AND SOCIETY: RESPONSES TO SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS IN CHINA 27
Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, eds., 2009).
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was dependent not on compliance with legal rules and duties, but rather on
their ability to negotiate the state in a way which enhanced and maximised the
political, social and administrative legitimacy' of their actions. 8 Legal legitimacy,
in the sense of recognition and acceptance by formal law-based institutions
(registration) was, when achieved, generally only attainable after years of building
up recognition and acceptance in social, bureaucratic and political spheres. For
many organisations, legal legitimacy was not considered necessary for operational
security and capabilities, it being very often possible to attain acceptance by local
officials and society without needing to be first in compliance with formal law.
Legality was accordingly often not considered an important goal, and the 'legal'
aspect of legitimacy was understood and treated in practice as subordinate in
value to its other aspects. Rather than being dependent on compliance with formal
law, the state-society relationship at this local level was essentially dependent on
different competing considerations relevant to political/ social/administrative
acceptability, factors which governed the legitimacy and therefore longevity of
'illegal' activity but which also shifted over time and differed from case to case.
For example, a general theme in NGO studies, highlighted by the corporatist
perspective and echoed at the grassroots level of this study, is that the statesociety relationship is such that officially recognised NGOs tend to be far more
involved in service provision than advocacy: "We can now hear the voice of civil
society... However the voices do not have an institutional position in the process
of decision making".' 9 Opportunities for such advocacy and participation are
very much contingent on the sensitivity of an NGO's chosen field of action, or,
we might say, the social and political legitimacy of the organization. 10
107 Gao, supra note 59.
108 This point relates closely to the many existing studies on the role of guanxiin Chinese
business, and the use of one's guanxiwang (network of social connections) to acquire
social capital and acceptance of an organization in its environment: see David Ahlstrom

and Gary Bruton, Learningfrom SuccessfulLocalPrivateFirmsin China:EstablshingLegitimay,
15(4)

THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE 72

(2001); Elliot Carlisle and David

Flynn, Small Business Surtival in China: Guanxi, egitimagy, and Sodal Capital,10(1) J. oF
DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 79 (2005).
109 Li, Shang and Cheng, supranote 51, at 66.

110 See further, for example, Guoqin Shen, The Development of Womenk NGOs in China, in
NGOs IN CHINA AND EUROPE (Yuwen Li ed., 2011), on the relatively warm reception of
women's NGOs in modem China, the goal of gender equality pursued by such NGOs
coinciding with government policies on women's liberation and social development.
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A major theme evident in my findings is that of discipline and paternalism.
Most notably at the local state/orphanage interface, and regardless of where
a particular home was located on the spectrum of security and apparent
permissibility, I repeatedly encountered incidents, discourse and interpretations
which echoed Stephens' thesis of disciplinary/parental social control in imperial
China. Interviewees spoke of scoldings, threats and berating, and of feeling at
the mercy of local officials regardless of what (scant) protection they ought to
ostensibly be afforded by law, policy and procedure. These paternalistic statesociety relationships, and the centrality of the concept of legitimacy to the
state-society interface in China, are relevant to understandings and expectations
relating to the concept and role of law in modern Chinese culture. The marked
concern with legitimacy over legality on the part of both officials and Chinese
interviewees, vis-a-vis the nature of non-state orphan care, demonstrates that the
legal/illegal binary presupposed by much socio-legal literature is not apposite in
the Chinese context. The aptness of the distinction is further called into question
by the degree to which the lawful/unlawful boundary is blurred in this area of
regulation. As Gupta argues in a different context, such blurring can be evidence
of the "descriptive inadequacy of categories to the lived realities that they purport
to represent"."' Rather than formal laws and policies determining the limits of
NGO activity, this sphere of activity is characterised by informal norms, unspoken
but widely understood by those successfully persevering in the face of ambiguity
and uncertainty. Compliance with these rules is an important aspect of achieving
and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of officials, and therefore their tolerance
or approbation. Moreover, the Chinese homes evinced a preoccupation with
(non-legal) legitimacy over legality as both functionally and intrinsically valuable." 2
An important conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the local 'legal culture'
of China is best described as legitimacy-centric rather than law-centric, which
manifests as an emphasis on negotiation over regulation - that is, the emergence
of normative understandings, in the context of local state-society interaction, is
111 Akhil Gupta, Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Poltics, and the
Imagined State, 22(2) AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 375, 384 (1995).
112 This contrasts with the views of Western informants, presented elsewhere, which
generally esteemed legality, in the sense of an attempt to comply with formal rules and
policy, as both functionally and intrinsically important.
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predominantly taking place beyond formal law-based institutions, roles and rules,
being more dependent on aspects of legitimacy than legality.
That is not to argue that the extra-legal nature of this sphere of activity is
solely attributable to this type of legal culture. As Shieh points out, one important
reason why the legal regulatory mode continues to be usurped by negotiation and
other modes of state-society interaction is that "the regulatory mode has been
inadequate in keeping pace with changes in the NGO community"." 3 However,
it is argued that the peripheral role of law in this area of society (among others)
is, at least to some extent, related to a Chinese tradition in which flexibility,guanxi
(personal networks), renqing (human empathy and obligations) and individualised
justice are generally esteemed over abstract, general and certain rules, despite
central political rhetoric endorsing a move towards the rule of law. In this way,
the Chinese legal sensibility just described can be seen as constitutive of Chinese
culture, an "extremely characteristic part of the entire social fabric"," 4 and
itself in part constituted by culture. This analytical perspective is an important
corrective to the tendency in commentaries on Chinese law to attribute the notable
reliance, in many areas of activity (such as business and NGO work), on guanxi,
relationships and informal norms solely to a lack of adequate legal institutions and
structures," 5 without also examining underlying culturally-entrenched values and
expectations about how society is best ordered. Among my Chinese informants,
the dominant expectation regarding law was not that law would be impartially,
consistently and unambiguously defined and applied, but rather that flexible norms
would govern individualised, paternalistic relations with the state. This accords
with Hintzen's description of China as a culture in which individualised moral
decisions are traditionally emphasised above generalised legal rules, and law is
viewed as subordinate to the "dictates of morality", such morality being "rooted
113 Shieh, supranote 106, at 37.
114 GEERTZ, supranote 19.
115 See, e.g., Katherine Xin and Jone Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal
InstitutionalSupport,39(6) THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENTJOURNAL 1641 (1996), arguing
that in China, 'managers cultivate personal connections to substitute for reliable
government and an established rule of law' (at 1652); 'If laws and reliable government
cannot provide protection to those wishing to conduct business, businesspeople will
seek to create their own protection, drawing on the means available to them' (at 1655);
Ahlstrom and Bruton, supra note 59.
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in the very essence of reality and therefore constitut[ing] a more general and
lasting truth than the more concrete stipulations of the law"." Moreover, this
was not widely regarded as problematic or, in fact, widely regarded at all, due to
the emphasis in the field on legitimacy over legality, and discretionary, paternalistic
relationships over law-governed, standardised interactions. While it may not be
possible to speculate to what extent these features of a 'non-legal' local society are
inherent in Chinese culture and a preferred alternative framework for structuring
social order, and to what extent they are simply a 'fill-in' necessitated by a lack
of adequate, standard and enforced legal institutions and norms, it is important
to ensure that inquiries about the maintenance of an ordered and predictable
state-society interface in China are approached with a degree of reflection and
awareness of one's underlying culturally-shaped assumptions about the normative
nexus between law and order. It is apparent from the case of this field of activity
that Chinese expectations, meanings and experiences relating to law and order, as
evident at the level of the local state-society interface, are vastly different to those
evident in Western law-centric societies. This 'micro' picture adds distinction to
existing 'macro' narratives of central law-lauding rhetoric and China's on-going
transition towards rule by/of law. It demonstrates an on-going embedded cultural
preference for non-legal order, for t over fa, and continued state-paternalism
which resonates with Thomas Stephens' construction of China as an arena in
which 'small-world' environments can be and often are coordinated and ordered
by a disciplinary, as opposed to legal, framework.

2. Legal Fictions and Legal Sensibility
On the other hand, formal laws are not completely irrelevant, with the
shadow of the threat of their enforcement being an important element in the
power-balance of those relationships and games, by contributing to the perceived
disciplinary power of the state. Further, in this (non-)legal culture, formal laws
seem to be playing a possible symbolic role, a phenomenon which should be
investigated further in future studies on China's law/practice gaps. That is, in the
current study, formal laws, which ostensibly regulate orphanages in China, as an

116 I-Intzen, supra note 9, at 183.
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allow the maintenance of a certain 'presentation

of self' - namely, that 'only government cares for orphans in China'. This
points to a possible function of formal laws as a "repository of aspirations"," 8
symbolism, ideology and rhetoric, where such rhetoric is of great social and
political importance, however ineffectual and irrelevant such laws might appear
in practice. Another way to describe this hypothesis is that formal laws at times
constitute a legal fiction with a stabilising function." 9 If that be the case in the
field of orphan care, it is possible that attempts to legally codify and tighten the
permissibility of non-state orphan care would in fact, by drawing attention to the
gap between ideology and practice, and due to the importance of this presentation
of self, lead to the closure of socially-useful informal practices, a disincentive both
on the part of officials and social actors to seeking more formalised structure
of the field. 2 0 In other words, the gap between law and practice may itself be
performing a function - and in this sense be aproductive contradiction - by allowing
controlled, cautious, experimental growth of the sector. Such a conclusion would
challenge law-centric assumptions that ambiguous regulatory policies necessarily
'chill' the development of the sectors they purport to regulate.' 2 '

117 In his ethnographic study based on formal and informal interviews with Chinese

intellectuals, Link notes a common contrast between official and unofficial modes
of expression in China (although this is of course not necessarily a uniquely Chinese
contrast): PERRY LINK, EVENING CHATS INBEIJING; PROBING CHINA'S PREDICAMENT (W
W Norton & Company, 1992).
118 Cotterrell, referring to Durkheim's view of law as 'an expression of ideals. It has moral
meaning. It is a repository of aspirations.. .': ROGER COTTERRELL, EMILE DURKHEIM: LAw
IN A MORAL DOMAIN (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) at 16. For other examples of
legal texts, without direct effect but arguably serving symbolic functions, see PATRICK
WORMALD, LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST: LAW As TEXT, IMAGE AND
EXPERIENCE (Hambledon Press, 1999) and PAUL DRESCH, THE RULES OF BARAT: TRIBAL
DOCUMENTS FROM YEMEN (Centre Francais D'Archaeologie et des Sciences Sociales,
2006).
119 BARBARA YNGVESSON, BELONGING IN AN ADOPTED WORLD (U. Chicago Press, 2010), at

80, makes a similar claim in relation to other legal fictions associated with transnational
adoption, arguing that "[a] key distinction in keeping adoptions clean is the legal fiction
that money is never paid for the child but only for services performed in connection

with the adoption.. baby-selling.. threatens our very understanding of what it means
to be (a person) and in this sense destabilizes not only the child who has been sold, but
society itself".
120 JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 164, makes the point in relation to informal adoption practices.
121 Ashley and He, supra note 37, at 265.
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There was little evidence of a perceived nexus, on the part of the Chinese
informants, between law-abidance and justice or morality. On the contrary, my
Chinese informants on the whole appeared fairly comfortable within a statesociety relationship premised on discretion, and in which law, when relevant,
could be anticipated to be used as one tool at the state's disposal for regulating
social activity (which points to local expectations of 'rule by law' rather than 'rule
of law'). Most players in the field demonstrated deftness at functioning in the
absence of legally-defined relationships, with recurring reference in interviews
and behaviour to game-playing, trust-building, and keeping up appearances. Thus
we see that the role of law in the transitioning society of China is subordinate to
other structures and processes, with law as a concept not constructed locally in
the same way as it is in Western law-centric contexts. This is not to presume that
thirty years of law institution building and legal reform has not begun to influence
this prevailing 'legal sensibility', but as Peerenboom notes, "the development of
the legal system hinges on more than the ideas of the top leadership".'2 2 The
local state-society interface visible in the current snapshot demonstrates that the
central law-lauding rhetoric has only begun to penetrate China locally,with themes
of discipline and paternalism continuing to dominate trends of adjudication and
equality in practice. If, as Peerenboom claims, rule of law is a function of both
institution-building and the creation of a 'culture of legality',12 3 studies such as the
present are important for adding to the picture of to what extent such a culture
of legality can really be said to be present locally.

VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Apart from its empirical and theoretical contributions to research and
literature on the aforementioned themes of modern Chinese socio-legal
scholarship, this study has sought to introduce some of the stories of China's
private orphanages. These stories contribute to a bigger picture of China's shifting
social welfare landscape but are important in and of themselves, providing insight
into the challenges and struggles experienced by charity workers as they operate
in an uncertain and at times still hostile social sphere. In the same way, networks
122

PEERENBOOM, supra note 9, at 223.

123 Id. at 221.
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of informal adoptive parents have emerged across China to take in unknown
numbers of unregistered foundlings, 2 4 So more and more such children are
being cared for collectively by private orphanages. In some, the quality of care is
high, but in many cases, economic backwardness is evident, children suffer the
effects of a lack of legal personality, and standards of care are set internally, with
grave concerns expressed by observers about care practices and the necessities
of life. Operators face significant obstacles, such as lack of financial resources,
inadequate training, ageing residents, and the dilemma of planning a future for
hukou-less children with no prospect of adoption or state support. Interviewees
varied greatly in their degree of optimism regarding the rate of development
of orphan care, and state-society cooperation in this area. The advantage of
a system that oversees private orphanages beyond the legal framework is that
it allows good work to be done for orphaned children despite the restrictions
of formal law. However, if government is at all concerned with allowing more
charitable individuals and groups to carry out life-saving work, the strategy or
trend is not strong in the long-term. Children continue to languish in substandard
state orphanages because it is so hard for organised, visible charities to intervene
and assist in provision of care in a meaningful, large-scale way without attracting
suspicion or causing the state to lose face. Some interviewees expressed hope
that the informal, non-legal operations of private orphanages has contributed to
a softening of the government's approach to the sector, and indirectly therefore
to better care for orphans more generally. The sector is cautiously evolving, and
there is reason to presume it will continue to do so and to be hopeful such growth
will lead to better outcomes for China's 'lonely children'.

124 JOHNSON, supranote 51, at 161.
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APPENDIx

A

Table of Interviews

TABLE Al
LIsT OF INTERVIEWS WITH CASE STUDY ORPHANAGES

Interviewee

Orphanage

Location'

Date

Project manager (Kramer)

Guanghui

Hebei

7/9/10

Visiting physiotherapist

Guanghui

Hebei

7/10/10

Visiting teacher

Guanghui

Hebei

7/13/10

Manager/ co-founder (Qin)

Guanghui

Hebei

7/13/10

Manager

Our Lady's

Hebei

7/20/10

Co-founder (Chen)

Our Lady's

Hebei

21/7/10

Co-managers

Good Shepherd

Beijing

7/25/10

Volunteer coordinator

Home of Joy

Shanghai

10/13/09

Manager/ co-founder

Rainbow House

Hebei

7/12/10

Manager

Star Village

Beijing

8/20/09

Founder/ director (Leng)

Star Village

Beijing

8/9/10

Volunteer coordinator

Chen Anhui

Shanghai

10/4/2009

APPENDIX

B

Profles of GrassrootsOrganigationsand Informants

Participants from a total of 25 different orphan-related grassroots NGOs
were interviewed as part of the broader research project. My analysis is primarily
based on interviews undertaken fromJuly to October 2009 andJuly to September
2010 with representatives of 24 orphan-related, (mostly) grassroots NGOs located
in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Anhui, Shanxi andJiangsu provinces and the
Beijing and Shanghai municipalities. In total, over 75 people assisted in this research
by sharing their thoughts and experiences in interviews, conversations and NGO
activities. All interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity. Where
referenced herein, organizations and place names are referred to by pseudonyms.
These NGOs' fields of activity are roughly categorized in table C1.
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On both research trips, approximately half of my time was spent living at
various orphanages and foster homes, helping out with child-care, administrative
work and English lessons, in order to more closely observe their operations and
daily living. Fieldwork was conducted with approval from the University of Oxford
Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-divisional Research Ethics Committee
(IDREC).' 2 5 I translated Chinese interviews to English freely rather than literally,
with regard to linguistic nuance and emphasis.

TABLE BI
ORPHAN-RELATED
Description

Chinese-run orphanage

NGOs By AcTIvITY

No. of NGOs

7

Chinese-run orphanageSupport organization

2

Chinese-run foster home

2

Foreign-run foster home

14

Total

25

Interviews were also conducted with a number of child-related NGOs,
both foreign and Chinese, with primary content covering NGO laws, policies
and practice, registration procedures, and issues relating to Chinese civil society
more generally; a retired senior level Ministry of Civil Affairs' 2 6 official; and the
following government and government-owned departments and entities: the
Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information Centre;12 7 the
Shandong Charity Federation Office, 2 8 and the Ministry of Civil Affairs NGO
Service Centre. 2 9

125 Reference number: SSD/CUREC21/CIA 10-010.
126 The Ministry of Civil Affairs is the administrative authority responsible, inter alia, for

welfare programmes.
127 Zhonghuarenmingongheguominghengbu- hongmincishanjuanghuxiaoxighongxin,in Beijing, (Sep.,
2009) [by email].
128 Shandongshengoishanghonghui,in Jinan, (Sep. 21, 2009).
129 Zhonghuarenmingongheguominghengbu- minjiangughifuwughongxin,in Beijing, (Sep. 18,2009)
[by telephone].
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